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INTRODUCTION 1
One issue existed in the taxi service market of today is the imbalance between taxi supply and 2 demand (1) , which may cause two negative impacts to the demand side and supply side of the 3 taxi: one is the longer waiting time of customers who are waiting at taxi stands or on the 4 streets; the other is the longer empty taxi cruising time. The two negative impacts cause not 5 only the waste of social resources for both customers and taxi drivers but also environmental 6 problems such as the emissions generated by taxis when they are searching and waiting for 7 customers on the congested road network. 8
To alleviate the aforementioned issue, automatic taxi dispatching approaches have 9 been widely used in many large cities worldwide, in which customers can book taxis directly 10 through phones or mobile devices (2, 3). Compared with the traditional ways that hailing on 11 the street or waiting at taxi stand, booking taxis through the dispatching system has more 12 advantages: it provides an alternative way for customers and taxi drivers to find each other 13 easily (4). However, one practical problem in adopting the dispatching system is that 14 customers may not have strong willingness to take taxis by booking. For example in 15
Singapore, the largest taxi company ComfortDelGro has received an average of around 16 65,000 booking calls daily in the year of 2010; however it only accounted for about 17% of 17 the total daily trips made by its taxi fleet (5). In Beijing, the taxi booking rate is even lower as 18 compared with the case in Singapore (6). In other words, waiting at taxi stand or hailing on 19 the street for incoming available taxis may still be the major and popular ways of getting taxis. 20
To differentiate between taxi service with bookings to that without bookings, the following 21 two terms are defined in this paper: 22  Booking Taxi Service (BTS): taking taxis by booking through phones or mobile devices; 23  Non-Booking Taxi Service (NBTS): taking taxis by either waiting at taxi stand or hailing 24 on the street. 25
One obvious difference between these two types of taxi service is that customers need 26 to reserve taxis in BTS but do not need in NBTS. Furthermore, another important difference 27 is that both taxis and customers who are searching for each other actually bear different levels 28 of risks accordingly. For example, in BTS, the taxi takes lower risk while the customer takes 29 higher one: once a taxi has confirmed with a booking request, the customer who has made the 30 booking should wait until the arrival of the taxi; however, in NBTS, the taxi takes higher risk 31 while the customer takes lower one, this is because the taxi-customer searching (or matching) 32 process in NBTS is not bounded to any agreement so that a customer can take any available 33 taxis coming to his/her location, but a taxi receives no guarantee to find a customer when 34 heading to any taxi stand. 35 Thus, the problem to be studied in this paper can be described as the Taxi-Customer 36
Searching Problem (TCSP) in Non-Booking Taxi Service (NBTS), TCSP-NBTS in short. The 37 objective of this paper aims to seek for an efficient control strategy for the : the former presented a shortest travel time dispatching rule based on  1  current traffic conditions while the latter proposed an agent-based dispatching policy that has  2  enabled taxis to negotiate and cooperate with each other to achieve group objectives. There  3 are still other studies (12-15) on the topic of taxi service which are more or less based on or 4 related to the aforementioned models. 5
However, the existing taxi modeling approaches are inadequate to study the control 6 strategies for the TCSP-NBTS. On one hand, the mathematical and macro-simulation models 7 have been formulated in highly aggregated forms which is difficult to capture the micro-level 8 details such as the dynamic customer behaviors (e.g. booking, cancellation, etc.) and the 9 processes of control strategies (e.g. automatic dispatching, information sharing, etc.); on the 10 other hand, even though the microscopic simulation models could be used for studying the 11 taxi service and corresponding control strategies in a detailed level, the dynamic customer 12 behaviors were not considered. Moreover, the simulation-based models mostly focused on the 13 dispatching strategies for BTS but not the control strategies for NBTS. For these reasons, this 14 paper continues to model the taxi service using the microscopic simulation approach and is 15 integrated with more functions to meet the following research objectives: 16 The Limited Information Sharing Strategy (LISS) is a decentralised control strategy 21 that requires both the taxi and the customer to be equipped with mobile devices that can form 22 ad-hoc networks among them. Unlike other decentralised control strategies such as the 23 agent-based dispatching approaches proposed by Seow and Lee (4) in which taxis could 24 communicate with each other (but not with customers) to find the optimal solution, the 25 proposed LISS will enable customers to communicate with taxis via mobile devices directly 26 so as to reduce the taxi-to-taxi communication costs. The LISS proposed in this paper will 27 adopt the game theoretical formulation, which has been applied in few other related areas 28 such as the Vehicle-Target Assignment Problem (VTAP) (16) (17) (18) (19) . It has to be noted that the 29 TCSP-NBTS is not simply a variant of VTAP but has the following distinctive 30 characteristics: 31  Dynamic behaviors of both the taxi and the customer need to be considered; 32  Customers may wait at the same geographical locations, i.e. queuing in the same taxi 33 stand; 34  The travel time between the taxi and the customer may be affected by the road traffic 35 conditions; 36  The definitions for the global utility of the game and the individual utility of the player 37 (the taxi or the customer) in the game theoretical formulation may consider a number of 38 theoretical and practical problems. 39
In summary, the ultimate goal of this paper is to develop and test the devised LISS for 40
the TCSP-NBTS. The microscopic traffic simulation is adopted in this research as the 41 approach for modeling and analysis of taxi operations. A plugin based on the APIs 42 (Application Programming Interfaces) of the traffic simulator is designed to simulate the 43 dynamic customer behaviors and the control strategies. The performance of the LISS will be 44 evaluated and compared with the strategy without LISS in terms of two performance 45 indicators: 1) the taxi Occupancy Rate (OR): the ratio between the total occupied time and 46 the total operating time of all taxis; 2) the Customer Waiting Time (CWT): the average 1 waiting time of all customers. 2
The rest of the paper will be organized as follows: the problem formulation will be 3 presented in Section 2; the solution algorithm will be introduced in Section 3; the simulation 4 experiments will be presented in Section 4; followed by the conclusion in Section 5. 5
PROBLEM FORMULATION 6
The objective of this paper is to develop a LISS for the TCSP-NBTS which is expected to 7 reduce the CWT of the customer and reduce (or mediate) the risk of the taxi (e.g., the 8 probability of losing the total occupied time) in a certain level. Moreover, the Taxi-Customer 9
Negotiation Process (TCNP) which is the core process in LISS will also be introduced. 10
The Problem Assumptions 11
Assumptions for taxi operations/customer behaviors in the TCSP-NBTS and the limited 12 information sharing mechanism in LISS are presented in the following: 13  Taxi operations: taxis are assumed to be running freely on a road network G = (V, E) 14
where V is the set of nodes (junctions) and E is the set of links (road segments). A vacant 15 taxi VT i can pick up customer(s) at a taxi stand TS j ∈TS ⊂ V where TS is the set of all 16 taxi stands (for simplification but without loss of generality, the case of picking up 17 customers on a road segment V k ∈V will not be considered in this problem). If a taxi has 18 no customer occupied during the operating time, it will randomly choose a destination 19 (e.g. a taxi stand) to look for a new customer; otherwise, it will be heading to the 20 destination of the customer currently occupied on it. 21  Customer behaviors: the arrival of customers to a taxi stand TS j ∈TS is modeled as 22
Poisson point process which is similar to the modeling of service requests in Arsie et al. 23 (18) . Arrived customers will be then queued at taxi stands and waiting for taxis to arrive. 24
If a customer has been waiting at a taxi stand for more than a certain period of time but 25 no taxi arrives, the customer may decide not to wait any longer. This period of time is 26 defined as the Maximum Customer Waiting Time (MCWT). 27  Limited Information Sharing: both the taxi and the customer are assumed to be equipped 28 with mobile devices that can communicate with each other. These mobile devices can 29 form ad-hoc networks (e.g., IEEE 802.11 wireless networks) as decentralized control 30 systems. The customers' devices are detectable during their waiting periods. One 31 constraint should be considered is that each mobile device has only limited searching 32 range (e.g. 500 -1000m), i.e., a mobile device can only communicate with others that are 33 located within its searching range but not those who are outside the range. 34 35
The Taxi-Customer Negotiation Process (TCNP) 36
The Taxi-Customer Negotiation Process (TCNP) is designed as the core process in LISS 37
which will be performed periodically in the system: assume at time t, a new round of TCNP 38 which can be denoted as TCNP(t) is about to start, there are N VT (t) numbers of vacant taxis 39 running on different locations of the road network G. At the same time, there are N WC (t) 40
numbers of customers waiting at N WTS (t) number of taxi stands. It is possible that N WC (t) ≥ 41 N WTS (t) which means customers can be queuing at the same taxi stand. Then the TCNP(t) will 42 be performed to provide a solution on which taxi goes to which stand so that a global 43 objective can be achieved. 44
It has to be noted that this strategy requires no commitment from the customer which 45 is an important difference from other strategies such as the automatic/agent-based dispatching 46 (4, 11). In this problem, a customer can at any time leave the taxi stand or choose another taxi 1 even if a yet arrived vacant taxi have already decided to pick up him/her. The TCNP(t) only 2 concerns the negotiation process in time t but not consider any future scenarios. 3
A number of methods can be adopted for performing and solving the TCNP, e.g., the 4 decentralized agent-based approach proposed by Seow and Lee (4) where taxis could 5 communicate directly with each other (but not with customers) to find the optimal solution in 6 BTS. However, due to the huge amount of demand for the NBTS, the taxi-to-taxi 7 communication will be mounted to a considerably high level in TCNP. Thus, a 8 game-theoretical formulation is adopted to perform and solve the TCNP, which is also a 9 decentralized system. In this type of formulation, only the taxi-to-customer communication is 10 allowed so that the cost of taxi-to-taxi direct communication is saved. Therefore, the potential 11 computational resource of the mobile device of the customer could be utilized. 12
Game-Theoretical Formulation for TCNP 13
The game-theoretical formulation for the TCNP can be described as follows: at time t, let the 14 N VT (t) vacant taxis are denoted as 
The vacant taxi VT i (t) can decide to choose any waiting customer in CC i (t) to head to, 20 and the decision of VT i (t) can be denoted as a i (t). If VT i (t) has decided to choose WC j (t)∈ 21 CC i (t) to head to, we can say that VT i (t) has engaged to WC j (t), or a i (t) = WC j (t). It has to be 22 noted that VT i (t) can also have no engagement to any waiting customer. The set of decisions 23 of vacant taxis VT i (t)∈VT(t) for all i∈{1,…,|VT(t)|}, namely the decision profile, can be 24
where a(t)∈A(t) and A(t) is the set of all possible 25 decision profiles. Let a -i (t) be the set of decisions of all vacant taxis except VT i (t), so that {a i 26 (t), a -i (t)} = a (t). Let A -i (t) be the set of all possible a -i (t) so that a -i (t)∈A -i (t). Each decision 27 profile can return a global utility U g (a(t)) which is the objective of the TCNP to maximize, 28 and each vacant taxi VT i (t) has a utility function
The TCNP is formulated as a multi-player game in which taxis behave as 30 non-cooperative agents that can make independent decisions. To get the solution of the game 31 or the agreement among all taxis, the concept Nash Equilibrium (NE) is introduced: at time t, 32
an NE is a decision profile 
a t U a t a t a t a t a t a t
If we substitute the potential function ( ( )) at  with the global utility U g (a(t)): 4
The motivation of introducing the concept of ordinal potential games in TCNP is to 6 forge a tight link between the utility function of taxi ( ( )) i VT U a t and the global utility function 7 U g (a(t)), i.e., taxis will maximize their own utilities which also improve the global utility at 8 the same time. So the next step is to choose the utility function of taxi and the global utility 9 function properly so that an ordinal potential game can be formed. 10
Definition 2.2 the global utility function: The global utility function U g (a(t)) will be 11 defined as the summation of all waiting customers' utilities, which is from the perspective of 12 the customers. 13
In Equation (1) 
a t is the benefit a waiting customer WC j (t) can get when more than one vacant taxis 17 may engage to him/her. Further, and the estimated arrival time of that taxi is denoted as t j , 1 = t+ TT(i, j, t). 28 Then, the waiting customer's utility function can be defined by Equation (2):
Thus, the waiting customer's utility can be interpreted as the "opportunity cost" the 32 customer can save during his/her waiting period at the taxi stand. 33 Definition 2.3 the utility function of taxi: if the vacant taxi VT i (t) has engaged to the 34 waiting customer WC j (t), i.e., a i (t) = WC j (t), the utility function of taxi VT i (t) is defined as the 35 difference between WC j (t)'s utilities when VT i (t) has/hasn't engaged to WC j (t). 36
This type of definition is named Wonderful Life Utility (WLU) (21) in which the 1 utility of the taxi is defined as the marginal contribution to the utility of the customer engaged 2 by the taxi. It turns out that Definitions 2.2 and 2.3 ensure that an ordinal potential game can 3 be formed. 4
THE SOLUTION ALGORITHM 5
Based on the game-theoretical formulation for TCNP introduced in Section 2, the solution 6 algorithm for periodically performing the TCNP is proposed in this section. Assume at time t 7 when the new round TCNP(t) is to be performed, the pseudo code for the TCNP(t) is shown 8
in Table 1 . 9
TABLE 1 The Pseudo Code for TCNP(t) 10
Input: set of vacant taxis VT(t) and set of waiting customers WC(t) Output: VT(t) allocated to WC(t) 1 Phase 1: Initialization 2
For Each vacant taxi VT i (t)∈VT(t) 3
VT i (t) constructs CC i (t) which is the set of all waiting customers within VT i (t)'s searching range 4
Loop 5 Phase 2: taxi-customer negotiation 6
For k = 1:N, where N is the maximum number of negotiation rounds in TCNP(t) 7
For Each vacant taxi VT i (t)∈VT(t) 8
VT i performs G-RM-FM-I i (k) which may return a proposed waiting customer WC m (t)∈CC i (t) 9
If G-RM-FM-I i (k) returns null 10
Continue; 11
Else 12 VT i (t) engages to WC m (t), i.e., a i (t, k) = WC m (t) 13 Insert VT i (t) to ET m (t, k) which is the set of vacant taxis engaged to WC m (t) at time t, round k 14
End If 15
Loop 16
Set 
[0, ( ) ( , , )], 0 ( ( , )) 0, 0
In other words, the waiting customer's primary utility ( ( , )) j WC U a t k is the utility that 9 the waiting customer WC j (t) can get when choosing the taxi in ET j (t, k) with the shortest 10 travel time to him/her, and zero when no vacant taxi is engaged to WC j (t). 11
Definition 3.2 the secondary utility ' ( ( , )) j WC U a t k : at the k th round of TCNP(t), each 12 waiting customer WC j (t)∈WC(t) has a set of engaged taxis ET j (t, k) where |ET j (t,k)|= [0, ( ) ( , , )], 1 ( ( , )) ( ( , )), 1 The Calculation of Customer Utility CCU j (k) can facilitate the process of calculating 23 the utilities in the TCNP(t) which also ensure that the problem is an ordinal potential game 24 throughout the entire TCNP(t). 25 26
The Generalized Regret Monitoring with Fading Memory and Inertia: G-RM-FM-I i (k) 27
At the k th round of the TCNP(t), each vacant taxi VT i (t)∈VT(t) can choose to propose a 28 waiting customer WC m (t)∈CC i (t) to engage, i.e., a i (t, k) = WC m (t). Since it is expected that 29 the global utility U g (a(t)) could be converged after certain rounds of negotiations, the 30 approach called the Generalized Regret Monitoring with Fading Memory and Inertia or 31 G-RM-FM-I is employed as the negotiation method. It has to be noted that: G-RM-FM-I i (k) 32 needs feedbacks from the CCU j (k-1) if a i (t,k-1)=WC j (t), and G-RM-FM-I i (k) is performed 33 prior to CCU j (k), so that G-RM-FM-I i (k) will not be performed for any vacant taxi VT i (t) in 34 the 1 st round (k=1) of the negotiation, and VT i (t) can make its proposal randomly in this round. 1 The following steps elaborate how G-RM-FM-I i (k) works at the negotiation round as and 2 when k >1. 3  Step 1: calculate ( ( , 1)) i VT U a t k  4 ( ( , 1)) i VT U a t k  is the utility of the vacant taxi VT i (t) with the World Life Utility 5 (WLU) type definition: 6 7 ' ( ( , 1)) ( ( , 1)), ( , 1) ( ), 1 ( ( , 1)) 0, ( , 1) , 1
 is the utility the vacant taxi VT i (t) can get when it changes the 10
while the choices of all other vacant taxis remain the same. Suppose 11 that CC i (t) ≠φ, and VT i (t) has engaged to WC j (t) in the round k -1, i.e., a i (t,k-1)=WC j (t), there 12
are four different cases that need to be considered in the calculation: 13 14
Case 1: 
Where:
( , ) ( ( ), ( , 1)) ( ( , 1)) response to different strategies (or decisions), The G-RM-FM-I will enable the negotiation 29 process to converge to a pure Nash Equilibrium (NE) almost surely. The TCNP proposed in 30 this paper has the same properties with the case in Arslan et al. (19) , so that it also has the 31 same convergence ability when the G-RM-FM-I is applied. 32
It has to be noted that the NE obtained by G-RM-FM-I may be a sub-optimal solution 33 in terms of maximizing U g (a(t)) for TCNP(t), which is a trade-off between the operational 1 efficiency and the theoretical optimality. On one hand, even though there are negotiation 2 mechanisms such as the Spatial Adaptive Play (SAP) that can lead to an optimal or near 3 optimal solution (16), those mechanisms are too time consuming to be implemented in the 4 TCNP where states of both the taxi and the customer are changed quickly; on the other hand, 5 the convergence tests by the simulation experiments in Section 4.2.1 show that G-RM-FM-I 6 has a good convergence performance which results in a better operational performance. in PARAMICS as shown in Figure 1 which includes two types of taxi stand: 15  Taxi stands located within the study area (the boundary of the study area is shown in 16 Figure 1 ); 17  Taxi stands located outside the study area (in fact, these taxi stands can be considered as 18 located in the fringe areas adjacent to the study area). 19 20
FIGURE 1 The road network for simulation. 21
In the simulation, the customer behaviors and taxi operations as well as the limited 22 information sharing mechanism are simulated strictly following the assumptions presented in 23
Section 2.1. The customer demand is set to 400 arrivals/hour for the taxi stands located 24 outside the study area and 520 arrivals/hour (30% higher than 400 arrivals/hour) for the taxi 25 stands located inside the study area. The purpose of doing this is to mimic the boom in 26 customer demand of a specific area during a specific period of time, e.g., the Central 27
Business District (CBD) during the peak-hour.
28
A sensitivity analysis is performed by varying the taxi fleet size from 100 to 250 at the 29 increment of 50 taxis, in which the performance of LISS is evaluated and compared with the 30 strategy without any control (i.e., the free search strategy) in terms of OR and CWT for each 31 A taxi stand within the study area A taxi stand outside the study area
The boundary of the study area taxi fleet size. 1 Other parameters of the simulation are set as following: In LISS, the TCNP will be 2 performed in every 100 seconds in which  and are set to 0.1 and 0.5 for the sub-module 3 G-RM-FM-I i (k). The searching range of the taxi is set to 500m. The MCWT of the customer 4 is arbitrarily set to 1 hour which is purposely to test the maximum CWT. The total simulation 5 period is 2 hours with 20 minutes warm-up time. 
The Sensitivity Analysis 1
The overall performance of the two strategies (free search strategy and LISS) in terms of OR 2 and CWT for different fleet size are shown in Figure 3 . compared with the free search strategy. However, when taxi supply is high (taxi fleet size > 3 175), LISS is no better than the free search strategy in terms of reducing the CWT. This is 4 because the number of available taxis is much higher in such situation so that the customer 5
can quickly find the taxi arrives to the stand (even under the free search strategy) which 6 makes the LISS less attractive. 7
For taxi stands located within the study area as shown in Figure 3(b) , when taxi 8 supply is low (taxi fleet size < 150), LISS can effectively reduce the CWT up to around 80% 9 (taxi fleet size = 100) compared with the free search strategy. When taxi supply is high (taxi 10 fleet size > 150), LISS is still (slightly) better than the free search strategy in terms of 11 reducing the CWT. 12
As shown in Figure 3 (c), the OR of taxi under LISS is no lower than that under the 13 free search strategy when taxi supply is high (taxi fleet size > 150), and the OR of taxi under 14 LISS is slightly higher than that under the free search strategy when taxi supply is low (taxi 15 fleet size < 150). This indicates that LISS will not increase the risk of taxi, i.e., the probability 16 of losing the total occupied time. 17
In all, the simulation results show that LISS is an effective control strategy to reduce 18 the CWT when taxi supply is low, especially for the situation of boom in customer demand of 19 a specific area during a specific period of time, e.g., the Central Business District (CBD) 20
during the peak-hour; moreover, LISS will not increase the risk of taxi even though it 21 requires no commitment from the customer side as stated in Section 2.2. 22
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 23
This paper has proposed a novel control strategy, namely the Limited Information Sharing 24
Strategy (LISS) for the Taxi-Customer Searching Problem (TCSP) in the Non-Booking Taxi 25
Service (NBTS), or TCSP-NBTS. The contributions of this paper are highlighted in the 26 followings: 27  Game theory has been adopted to formulate the LISS; the global utility of the game and 28 the individual utilities of the players (taxi and customer) are specifically defined by 29 considering a number of theoretical and practical problems; 30  A negotiation mechanism namely the Generalized Regret Monitoring with Fading 31
Memory and Inertia (G-RM-FM-I) has been adopted in LISS to find the Nash 32 Equilibrium (NE); 33  The operational performance of LISS has been evaluated in this paper by comparing with 34 the strategy without any control (i.e., the free search strategy). 35
The microscopic traffic simulation is adopted as the modeling approach in this paper. 36 A sensitivity analysis by varying the taxi fleet size is conducted by the simulation in which 37
the Occupancy Rate (OR) and the Customer Waiting Time (CWT) are calculated for all 38 scenarios in each control strategy. Some implications have been obtained from the results of 39 the simulation experiments: 40  The LISS is an effective control strategy when taxi supply is low, especially for the 41 situation of boom in customer demand of a specific area during a specific period of time, 42 e.g., the Central Business District (CBD) during the peak-hour; 43  LISS will not increase the risk of taxi even though it requires no commitment from the 44 customer side. 45
